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Abstract. The key agreement protocol based on infinite non-commutative group presentation and
representation levels is proposed.
Two simultaneous problems in group representation level are used: the conjugator search prob-
lem (CSP) and modified discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The modified DLP in our approach is a
matrix DLP and is different from that’s used in other publications. The algorithm construction does
not allow to perform a crypto-analysis by replacing the existing CSP solution to the decomposition
problem (DP) solution.
The group presentation level serves for two commuting subgroups and invertible group’s word
image matrix construction. The group representation level allows reliable factors disguising in the
initial word. The word equivalence problem (WEP) solution is transformed from the group pre-
sentation level to the group representation level. Hence there are not necessary to solve WEP in
the group presentation level and hence there are no restrictions on the group complexity in this
sense. The construction of irreducible representation of group is required. The presented protocol
is a modernization of protocol declared in (Sakalauskas et al., 2005).
Key words: key agreement protocol, conjugator search problem, discrete logarithm problem, group
representation.
1. Introduction
New ideas in public key cryptography using infinite non-commutative groups and semi-
groups appeared in (Sidelnikov et al., 1993). In the case of group, the main idea is based
on two of three known problems, declared by M. Dehn in 1910 and related with an infinite
non-commutative group (G, ·).
1. Word equivalency problem (WEP). For given two words ω1, ω2 ∈ G decide if
ω1 · ω−12 = 1 ∈ G.
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2. Conjugator search problem (CSP). For given μ, θ ∈ G find α ∈ G, that satisfies
relation
μ = α · θ · α−1.
So far these problems are the main ones in the cryptographic protocols construction
(including KAP) using infinite non-commutative group presentation level.
In general, the main cryptographic protocols are based on two main requirements:
firstly the WEP solution must be performed algorithmically efficiently and secondly CSP
solution must be intractable. For the basic group the additional requirement is that two
mutual commutative subgroups must be easily determined.
During the last decade the concrete realizations of cryptosystems, that meet these
requirements, were developed using braid groups. The reason of the interest concerning
the braid groups is that WEP has an effective solution algorithm, i.e., it has a polynomial
time complexity. The running time is quadratic with respect to the braid index. This is
achieved by words’ transformation to the left weighted canonical form. On the other hand
there is no known deterministic solution of CSP in polynomial time yet. But this fact
automatically does not mean the reliable security of that kind algorithms. The additional
requirement of two mutually commutative subgroups construction is easy satisfied in
braid groups.
The new cryptosystem using braid groups is presented in (Ko et al., 2000). Its security
is based on the complexity of CSP.
As it was pointed out in (Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2004) the intractability of CSP is not
a necessary condition for a KAP security in (Ko et al., 2000) algorithm. Considering the
crypto-analysis of this algorithm it was found that the original CSP can be reduced to the
other problem, which seems to be easier (Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2004). This problem
is called a decomposition problem (DP), and can be formulated as follows: for given
μ, θ ∈ G, find any α′, β′ ∈ G1 ⊂ G, that satisfies relation
μ = α′ · θ · β′.
Beside the CSP reducibility to the DP the presented algorithm is also vulnerable to
so-called “length-based” attack (Hughes and Tannenbaum, 2002).
Hence, according to Shpilrain and Ushakov the security of cryptosystems based on
the single CSP seems to be insufficient. On the other hand the solution of SCP is also
unnecessary since it can be replaced by the decomposition problem.
The other example of cryptosystem using infinite non-commutative group was pre-
sented in (Anshel et al., 1999). The security of this algorithm relies on two hard problems.
The first one is the simultaneous multiple CSP. The second one is the membership prob-
lem. Despite the opinion that simultaneous multiple CSP is easier than single CSP, it is
reckoned that membership problem in braid groups is very hard. According to (Shpilrain
and Ushakov, 2004), even if a polynomial time deterministic algorithm would be found
for solving CSP in, say, braid groups, this will not be sufficient to break the (Anshel et
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al., 1999) protocol by a deterministic attack since, in addition, this algorithm is supported
by additional hard problem, i.e., membership problem.
In general, the problem of cryptosystem construction, based on the infinite non-
commutative group, is to hide factors α and α−1 or α′ and β′ in the word μ (Shpilrain
and Ushakov, 2004). This problem is also actual in approach presented in (Anshel et al.,
1999) for braid groups. Hence, it is desirable that the cryptosystem construction based
on the infinite non-commutative group presentation level would be based not only on the
intractability of CSP, but at the same time on some other infeasible problem in addition.
This opinion is confirmed by the latest publication (Shpilrain and Ushakov, 2005).
The presented KAP lies also on the group presentation level and seems to be interesting
since the one of two commuting subgroup is hidden. This approach uses the CSP, the
centralizer’s calculation of some subgroup and the word membership to the subgroup
generated by certain word problem.
In this study we propose to use two infinite non-commutative group attributes: its pre-
sentation and representation levels. Using the similar ideas the digital signature scheme
was proposed in (Sakalauskas, 2005). We will follow the general ideas presented in
(Sidelnikov et al., 1993) expanding this approach to the group representation level.
We are not considering here the faithfulness of group representation, since for each
sufficiently complex group it requires a very deep algebraic-topological investigation.
Even in the case of braid groups the faithful representation was found only recently
(Krammer, 2000). In this connection we only assume, that the chosen representation is
complex enough to provide a very poor representation kernel, which does not signifi-
cantly influence to the security of proposed algorithm. In the case of braid groups we
choose the Burau representation in finite set matrix group over the Galois field.
The ideas to use the group representation level were declared in (Monico, 2002). The
example of cryptosystem based on finite semigroup action problem is there presented. It
is a multidimensional generalization of modular exponentiation using finite semigroup of
matrices or ring of matrix polynomials over finite vector field. As a consequence the pro-
posed semigroup action problem is a multi-dimensional generalization of the traditional
(one-dimensional) DLP and seems to be harder. This cryptosystem is used for session
key agreement protocol and ElGamal type encryption. According to the author, this cryp-
tosystem requires further investigations and first of all secure key length needs to be de-
termined. The author also pointed out, that a suitable algebraic system for cryptosystem
realization is not found yet.
We are using two simultaneous problems in group representation level: the matrix
CSP and matrix DLP ones. The DLP used in our approach is different from that used in
the (Monico, 2002). The CSP itself in the group representation level does not provide a
sufficient security but we reckon the entire security provided by both problems pretends
to be sufficient. The algorithm construction does not allow the replacing of existing CSP
to the DP solution.
The group presentation level serves for two commuting subgroups and inverted group
word image matrix construction. The group representation level allows a reliable factors’
disguising in the initial word. The WEP solution is transformed from the group presen-
tation level to the group representation level. Hence it is not necessary to solve WEP in
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the group presentation level and no restrictions on the group complexity are made. The
presented protocol is a modernization of protocol declared in (Sakalauskas et al., 2005).
The mathematical background in brief is presented in Section 2. The proposed KAP
is described in Section 3. Section 4 provides some considerations on the security analysis
issue. The discussions on realization of proposed algorithms are outlined in Section 5.
2. Mathematical Background
The main definitions used in this section could be found in (van der Waerden, 1967).
We consider an infinite non-commutative group (G, ·), presented by finite set of gen-
erators γ1..., γn and relations R1, R2..., Rl (Magnus et al., 1966). This definition consti-
tutes group G presentation level. As a suitable example, a braid group Bn can be choosed,
where n = k is the index of braid group (Ko et al., 2000). Further we will also call the
group G as basic group.
Let F be some field. Define m-dimensional vector space Fm over the field F . We
shall consider Fm as a module, which will be denoted in the following by M .
By Aut(M) we define a certain set of automorphisms A:M → M . According to
the definition, for each A ∈ Aut(M) there exists A−1 ∈ Aut(M) such that AA−1 =
A−1A = I ∈ Aut(M), where I is an identity automorphism.
In general the representation of group G is some homomorphism ϕ : G → Aut(M).
It is clear that Aut(M) = GL(m,F ), where GL(m,F ) is general linear group of all
m-dimensional invertible matrices over F . Then for all α ∈ G there exists A ∈ Aut(M)
such that ϕ(α) = A.
When m is finite we have a finite dimensional representation and when the homomor-
phism image is finite the finite image representation takes place. The latter occurs in the
case when infinite group G is represented by finite group of matrices in Aut(M).
Define two commutative subsets G1 and G2 in G. Assume that ϕ(G1) = Aut(M)1
and ϕ(G2) = Aut(M)2. Then if A ∈ Aut(M)1 and B ∈ Aut(M)2 the following
commutative relation takes place
AB = BA.
The multiplication of any matrix K ∈ Aut(M) with any element a ∈ M , which
we denote by Ka, is defined using the arithmetical operations in the field F , which we
denote, by Ka. This multiplication defines also a group G action on module M .
For further construction we will consider the Galois field GF (2k) (Menezes et al.,
1996) instead of abstract field F . Then the basic group G will be represented by m-
dimensional matrices over GF (2k), or in other words, by matrices in GL(m,GF (2k)).
3. Key Agreement Protocol
Consider two cryptographic entities Alice and Bob, which has two public elements a ∈
M and θ ∈ G. The elements θ and a can be considered also as a public key one of the
parties.
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The key agreement protocol is the following:
1. Alice chooses at random a secret element α ∈ G1. She forms a word
ω1 = α · θ · α−1.
2. Using homomorphism ϕ she obtains a matrix
U = ϕ(ω1) = ϕ(α · θ · α−1) = ϕ(α) · ϕ(θ) · ϕ(α−1) = AQA−1.
By choosing at random some secret natural number r, she calculates the matrix
R = Ur = (AQA−1)r = AQrA−1,
and sends R to Bob.
3. Bob chooses at random a secret element β ∈ G2 and analogously forms a word
ω2 = β · θ · β−1.
4. Bob calculates
V = ϕ(ω2) = BQB−1.
By choosing at random some secret natural number s, he calculates the matrix
S = V s = (BQB−1)s = BQsB−1,
and sends S to Alice.
5. Each party calculates the elements KA and KB respectively
KA = ASrA−1 = A(BQsB−1)rA−1 = ABQsrB−1A−1, (3.1)
KB = BRsB−1 = A(AQrA−1)sB−1 = BAQrsA−1B−1. (3.2)
The common secret key is Ka = KAa = KBa, since AB = BA and Qsr = Qrs.
The motivation of group representation level application relies on the following as-
pects.
1. The representation level provides a good diffusion of group generators to disguise
factors α, α−1 and β, β−1 in initial words ω1 and ω2 respectively. In the case of
complicated groups without normal forms the disguising procedure can dramati-
cally increase the length of transformed initial word. Moreover, as it is pointed out
in (Shpilrain and Zapata, 2004) the amount of work needed to disguise a factors by
using the defining relations is about the same as needed to recover an element from
its disguised form.
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2. The WEP solution from group presentation level is transformed to its solution in
representation level. It is easy to perform this for every group having the repre-
sentation. The accuracy of WEP depends on the amount of representation kernel
elements. But we assume that the kernel is poor and that the probability of collision
is negligible.
3. The group presentation is used to provide the existence of random chosen inverse
matrices.
4. Security Analysis and Implementation
The security of proposed KAP relies on two simultaneous problems in group represen-
tation level: the matrix conjugator search problem (CSP) and matrix discrete logarithm
problem (DLP).
Let us consider both these problems separately.
The matrix CSP can be formulated as follows: for given Q and R find the conjugator
matrix A from the equation
R = AQA−1.
The matrix CSP alone in matrix group GL(m,F ) does not provides a sufficient secu-
rity since its solution can be performed in polynomial time. The unknown matrix A can
be found by solving the following homogenous matrix equation
RA−AQ = 0.
The matrix DLP is to find r for given m-dimensional matrices Q and P , satisfying
equation
P = Qr.
This problem can be reduced to the multiple ordinary DLP when Q can be transformed
to the diagonal form. If Q has a block diagonal form, the initial m-dimensional matrix
DLP can be splited to several li-dimensional matrix DLP where l1, . . . , lk are dimensions
of corresponding k blocks. The complexity in this case corresponds to the complexity
of k, li-dimensional matrix DLP. Hence it is required to build a matrix Q without lower
dimension invariant spaces or in other words the irreducible representation of basic group
must be used.
When we are considering the cryptanalysis of proposed KAP, we are facing with the
following problem: find matrix A and natural r for given matrices R and Q satisfying
relation
R = AQrA−1. (4.1)
Let us formulate and prove the proposition concerning the security of proposed KAP.
Key Agreement Protocol (KAP) Using Conjugacy and Discrete Logarithm Problems 121
PROPOSITION 1. The security of KAP relies on the simultaneous solution of two hard
problems: matrix conjugator search problems (CSP) and matrix discrete logarithm prob-
lem (DLP).
Proof. Let us try to split the solution of matrix CSP and matrix DLP separately trying
to obtain the secret key either KA or KB as in (3.1), (3.2).
Let us construct the first attack by solving the CSP firstly. Since the matrix Qr is not
known due to the fact that r is unknown, we can choose the arbitrary natural number k
and having matrix Q calculate the corresponding matrix
P = Qk.
Then instead of (4.1) we have the following relation with known R and P
R = A′PA′−1.
The matrix A’ can be determined by solving matrix CSP in polynomial time. As a
result, we obtain a matrix A′ instead of A.
Then having A′, S and k we can try to obtain the secret key
KA′ = A′SkA′−1 = A′BQskB−1A′−1.
But this cryptanalysis fails since KA′ = KA.
In the similar way the compromising of KA fails if we apply the second attack by
trying to solve the matrix DLP at first step separately. Then by guessing some conjugator
A” we can find r from the relation
A′′−1RA′′ = Qr,
having known R and Q. This problem corresponds to the matrix DLP and is conjectured
to be hard since the classical DLP is reckoned hard. Even if r could be computed, the
obtained key
KA′′ = A′′SrA′′−1 = A′′BQsrBA′′−1
is not equal to the KA from (3.1).
Hence we proved that both the matrix CSP and matrix DLP can not be solved sepa-
rately avoiding a total scan. Nor A′ neither A′′ can provide a valid session key determi-
nation if they are not equal to the actual matrix A. Analogously the adversary must find
the actual value r instead of choosing arbitrary value k.
We prove now that the CSP can not be replaced by the possible easier decomposition
problem solution. Assume that in order to reduce the computation time in first attack the
adversary is trying to choose the suitable matrices A1, A2 satisfying relation
R = A1QkA2 = A1PA2,
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for some selected k. But this attempt fails since the calculated key
K12 = A1SkA2
does not equal to the KA or KB . Moreover in this case the main conjugation identity is
also not valid, i.e., if A2 = A−11
(A1QA2)s = A1QsA2.
Hence the replacement of matrix CSP by matrix DP does not facilitate the attack.
As it is known, the classical DLP in cyclic group Zp∗ (Menezes, 1996) is hard and
the security of algorithms based on modular exponent, relies on it. It is sensible to expect
that the complexity of DLP in matrix group Aut(M) is more (or at least no less) complex
than in Zp∗ since for the transformation of matrix DLP to the multiple classical DLPs it
is required to transform the matrix to the diagonal form. But this can not be performed if
the basic group representation is irreducible.
The possible hardest DLP in matrix ring is introduced in (Monico, 2002). Hence we
can conclude that the complexity of considered matrix DLP is intermediate between the
DLP in Zp∗ and possible hardest DLP declared in (Monico, 2002).
Taking into account that in our case the total complexity is composed by both matrix
CSP and DLP, we can expect that proposed approach for KAP construction is promising.
Let the basic group be a braid group Bn of index n (Ko et al., 2000), and n = 32. To
code the 31 generator σ1..., σ31 and its inverses in B32, the 6 bits is required. Assume the
public element θ as a word in B32 can contain 128 generators in average. Then we have
6× 128 = 4096 bits to code the parameter θ.
For the braid groups a faithful Krammer representation is known (Krammer, 2000).
This representation is of order n(n−1)/2 = 496 and is comparatively complex to realize.
Moreover, the faithfulness of basic group representation is not important since we will
consider the finite image representation.
The other kind of representation is the Burau representation of order n (Long, 1994).
This representation is not faithful for n  6 and is defined by matrixes over the ring
Z[t, t−1] (Long and Paton, 1993). The kernel and the image structure of this represen-
tation is unknown yet. In general, even to determine the kernel element is a very hard
problem. Some kernel elements in Burau representation are known for n = 5, 6 (Turaev,
2000). The obtained kernel elements are very complex and do not facilitate the WEP
solution in group representation level.
For a proposed KAP realization we can choose the modified irreducible Burau type
representation. The irreducible Burau representation can be found in (Dian-Min Tong et
al., 1994). In this case Bn has the (n − 1)-dimensional representation. Our modification
relies on the substitution of representation matrices over the Z[t, t−1] with ones over the
GF (2k)[t, t−1]. In this case we have a finite image, irreducible Burau representation by
matrices in GL((n− 1), GF (2k)). Hence we have m = n− 1 = 31 and the module M
is a vector space GFm(2k) over GF (2k). According to (Birman et al., 1992) the deeper
investigation of finite image representations are probably very interesting.
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Let k = 64. Then the public parameter a ∈ GF 31(264) and a can be coded by 1984
bits.
In total the public parameters θ and a can be coded by 4096 + 1984 = 6080 bits.
The storage requirement for the matrices used in KAP is 31× 31× 64 = 61504 bits.
We have chosen these public parameters intuitively seeking to provide a better security
than the other known KAP. In some recent cryptosystems using Diffie–Hellman KAP the
modular exponent in Zp∗ is computed for module p of order 24096. As we see the number
expressed in 4096 bits is comparable with our one having 6080 bits.
We think the complexity estimation requires further investigations in order to find
the estimates of security parameters and their relation to the other security parameters of
known cryptographic primitives.
We estimate now a computation time, required to perform the KAP.
To calculate the KA and KB the only matrix multiplications are required. The creation
of matrices A and A−1 requires the 128 matrix multiplications each. These calculations
are simple and can be produced inO(m) time algorithm. The same is valid for matrices
B and B−1. To compute the matrix KA it is required 2+r+2+s matrix multiplications
inO(m2) time. The key Ka calculation can be performed inO(m) time.
Hence the KAP realization hasO(m2) time complexity. This complexity has the same
order as the complexity of modular exponent O(lg p), when m = 31 and p is of order
24096.
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Rakt ↪u apsikeitimo protokolas (RAP), panaudojant jungtinumo ir
diskretinio logaritmo problemas grupe˙s ↪ivaizdžio lygmenyje
Eligijus SAKALAUSKAS, Povilas TVARIJONAS, Andrius RAULYNAITIS
Jungtinuko suradimo ir diskretinio logaritmo problemos yra apibre˙žiamos begaline˙s nekomu-
tatyvios grupe˙s ↪ivaizdžio lygmenyje ir yra panaudojamos rakt ↪u apsikeitimo protokolo (RAP) reali-
zacijai. Pasiu¯lytas RAP turi didesn↪i kriptografin↪i saugum ↪a nei kriptosistemos, paremtos diskretinio
logaritmo problma, nes ši problema pakeicˇiama sunkesne matricinio diskrertinio logaritmo prob-
lema, j ↪a sujungiant kartu su jungtinuko suradimo problema.
